of discrimination, but for a rather crude acknowledgement that there should be some concession made towards disabled people and work. The legislation provided for a form of positive discrimination in the form of a quota for disabled workers in any employment undertaking and a number of reserved occupations 6 . The Act repealed this and set up a new structure of protection for disabled people in an attempt to address the growing concern 7 that disabled people were suffering from difficulties in obtaining employment and from prejudice once they managed to find their way into the workplace.
Following the passing of the Act in 1995, the Government published Towards Inclusion 8 and set up the Disability Rights Taskforce. The Disability Rights Commission published its review following the recommendations of the Taskforce 9 . Legislation was also passed to provide for a Disability Rights Commission ("the DRC") 10 . Subsequent to the 1995 Act the EC Framework Directive 2000/78/EC was issued. 11 A number of amendments have been made to comply with the Directive, principally made by the Disability Discrimination (Amendment) Regulations 2003 and the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. The most significant of these are the abolition of the following: the requirement that any mental impairment must result from a clinically well-recognised illness; 12 the exemption for employers with fewer 15 employees, 13 and the justification defence available to employers if there was a failure to make reasonable adjustments 14 . Most notably, the Act has also been amended to provide that people with HIV, cancer or multiple sclerosis are deemed to be disabled at the point of diagnosis 15 . However, arguably there are still areas of noncompliance with the Directive, perhaps most significantly in the context of the statutory obligation to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate disabled workers 16 . This is explored further below.
The current structure of disability discrimination in the UK
There are some basic concepts in discrimination law in the UK that are common to the various forms of anti-discrimination provisions. There are two forms of discrimination: direct and indirect. Direct discrimination is where there is less favourable treatment because of the person's sex or other protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination occurs when a provision, criterion or practice (such as a mobility clause or a certain standard of English) is applied to everyone but which has a disparate impact upon (EC/75/117) 
2000/43/EC which established the principle of equal treatment between persons regardless of racial or ethnic origin (gender discrimination had already been dealt with by the Equal Pay Directive

Direct discrimination
The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 protects against direct discrimination only 18 . Direct discrimination is unlawful inasmuch as an employer cannot use the fact of disability as a ground for treating someone less favourably, but less favourable treatment can be meted out for a reason which relates to the disability 19 . This is a distinction of excessive subtlety, and a distinction that would not be tolerated in the context of sex and race discrimination 20 .
Direct discrimination is defined as less favourable treatment when the relevant circumstances of the disabled person and another person (real or hypothetical 21 ) without that particular disability are not materially different. The discrimination can be justified if there is a reason that is both material to the circumstances of the particular case and substantial, 22 and the justification will only stand if no reasonable adjustment can be made 23 .
Reasonable adjustments
UK disability discrimination law is unique in the canon of legislation that offers protection against discrimination in that there is no provision to protect against indirect discrimination. The reason for this was that it was thought that there would be no need for indirect discrimination provisions because of the duty to make reasonable adjustments would render them unnecessary 24 . However, Bell is arguably correct in saying that if employers are mindful of a prohibition on direct discrimination, the more likely they are to move away from this and towards indirect forms of discrimination 25 . Furthermore, some employers at least, may well review their needs if they know that they are vulnerable to an indirect discrimination challenge.
The fact that indirect discrimination is not prohibited is only somewhat ameliorated by the obligation upon the employer to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate disabled workers. In some respects the language of the Act mirrors some of the language of the other discrimination legislation in relation to indirect discrimination 26 . However, as Wells has argued, the obligation to make reasonable adjustments does not oblige an employer to take preventative measures and "leaves no scope for a claim relating to an anticipated disadvantage" 27 . By way of contrast Article 2(2)(b) of the Directive 28 does specifically refer to measures that "would" place a disabled person at a disadvantage. Justification of such measures is permitted under the Directive, but the measure must be objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are proportionate and necessary 29. Another shortcoming of the Act is the specific provision that if the employer cannot be reasonably expected to know of the need for an adjustment this is a defence to an action under section 4A 30 .
The interaction between direct discrimination and reasonable adjustments has been summed up as meaning that the justification defence to an allegation of direct discrimination will not be made out if there has been a failure to comply with a section 4A reasonable adjustments duty 31 . Section 18B of the Act sets out the matters to which regard shall be had in deciding whether an employer has complied with the duty, and there is a very clear emphasis upon cost 32 .
However, Wells argues that in European law 'reasonableness' means effectiveness 33 . This is clearly at odds with the cost effective approach of the Act. Fredman has argued that if the employer does not pick up the cost of adjustments then that cost does not disappear; it will either fall on some other third party or the disabled individuals themselves 34 . Although many employment protection measures give rise to issues of cost, there is a compelling argument that this is a necessary price to pay for the cost of inclusion of people with disabilities 35 . The employer's duty to make reasonable adjustments only arises if, otherwise, the worker is at a 'substantial' disadvantage. The word 'substantial' has a wide range of meaning and "takes colour and meaning from its surroundings", but it was held that it does not have to be more than "worthy of consideration for the purposes of the Act" and that it is not equivalent to "considerable, solid or big" 36 .
Definition of disability
The issue as to what it means to be 'disabled' is central to this article. Disability is defined under section 1 of the Act as a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. This has to be read in conjunction with Schedule 1 of the Act that deals with specific conditions that will qualify the person as being disabled and, in other cases, with what is meant by 'long-term effects' and 'normal day-to-day activities'. Long term means that it has lasted for 12 months, or is likely to last for 12 months or for the rest of the life of the person concerned. Normal day-to-day activities are affected for the purposes of the Act only if the impairment affects one of the following: mobility; manual dexterity; physical co-ordination; continence; ability to lift, carry or otherwise move everyday objects; speech, hearing or eyesight; memory or ability to concentrate, learn or understand, and perception of the risk of physical danger 37 . The meaning of normal day-to-day activities was given a commendably wide interpretation in Paterson v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 38 where it was held that carrying out an examination or assessment (in this case, the internal assessments carried out by the police for the purposes of promotion through the ranks) is a normal dayto-day activity. The European Court of Justice has considered the concept of disability thus: "Directive 2000/78 aims to combat certain types of discrimination as regards employment … the concept of 'disability' must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional life" 39 . Arguably this definition is more satisfactory because it removes the need to decide upon whether a day-to-day activity is impaired and replaces it with an emphasis upon the applicant's ability to undertake work, which should be the key issue under consideration in an employment disability discrimination claim.
A recommendation made by the Disability Rights Commission in 2003 40 that the ability to communicate should be one of the criteria and that self-harming behaviour should be included has not been adopted. Certain conditions will qualify as imparting a disability without more, and they are: severe disfigurement, 41 cancer (with the proviso that regulations can be made to disapply the 'automatic' designation of disability in certain cases of cancer), HIV and multiple sclerosis 42 . The inclusion of severe disfigurements is interesting because they are rarely disabling in the common sense of the term and are not life-threatening, and yet there is an automatic assumption that they will have a substantial adverse effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day-to-day activities. that the statutory framework requires the effect on the ability to carry out day-to-day activities (i.e. what might be called the 'functional' formula) to be mentioned at all because it is fictitious in the case of most severe disfigurements, particularly because, as Doyle says: "This is a rare example of the legislation acknowledging a social model of disability rather than a purely medical one" 43 .
The issue of recurring impairments is dealt with in section 2(2) of the Act. If the disability in the past has had a substantial adverse effect on carrying out normal day-to-day activities, then if it ceases and recurs then it is treated as continuing to have that effect.
Those who have been disabled in the past are also protected by the Act (there is no time constraint so it does not matter that the earlier disability pre-dates the Act) on the basis that it would be inconsistent to give protection to those who are currently impaired, but not to protect from discrimination on the very same basis, those who have now recovered, particularly as part of the recovery process might be getting them back into employment 44 . However, the definition of disability still applies to past disabilities; the person still has to show that in the past they had a physical or mental impairment that had a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.
Knowledge of the disability
As we have seen, disability discrimination protection has two arms. First there is a prohibition on direct discrimination which in itself has two elements. It is absolutely prohibited to mete out less favourable treatment on the ground of the disability; if the less favourable treatment is for a reason related to the disability then this is prohibited unless the employer can justify it. Secondly, there is a duty to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate the worker's disability. In this case the Act specifically provides that there is only a duty on the employer who knows or can be reasonably expected to know of the disability. There is no specific requirement of 'knowledge' in the case of direct discrimination. In O'Neill v Symm & Co Ltd 45 the Employment Appeal Tribunal ("EAT") held that it is not possible for an employer to treat a person less favourably for a reason related to the disability without having actual or constructive knowledge of the disability or its 'material' features. A differently constituted EAT in H J Heinz & Co Ltd v Kenrick 46 stated that the test is one of objective causation: did the employer, in fact, act on the basis of disability even if the disability or its material features were absent from the employer's thinking? A disability might not be apparent to the employer, but its manifestation might be. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Clark v TDG Ltd t/a Novacold suggests, on the basis of statutory interpretation, that the latter view is to be preferred, and that it is more probable that Parliament meant "the reason" for the treatment to refer only to the facts constituting the reason for the treatment, and not to make the additional requirement of a causal link with disability 47 . 43 B Doyle, Disability Discrimination: Law and Practice, (2005 , Bristol: Jordans), p 27. 44 HL Deb vol 564, col 1655 . 45 [1998 ] IRLR 233. 46 [2000 ] IRLR 144. 47 [1999 ICR 951, at 963.
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Models of disability and discrimination
Disability -medical and social models
The definition of disability has raised both practical problems 48 and the accusation that the UK is following a 'medical' model of disability and not a 'social' model 49 . The debate on the two models goes back to the 1980s when disabled people questioned the premise upon which disability rights were based 50 . It assumed that disabled people suffered from some form of medical abnormality which meant that they did not fit into the regular world upon whom they were then dependent for largesse of one kind or another 51 . The 'social' model's basic premise is that disabled people are disadvantaged because of society placing unnecessary constraints upon their inclusion 52 . It is part of the view that successful, and powerful people are largely white, male and able-bodied and that this profile dictates the terms upon which (inter alia) disabled people can succeed in the employment field 53 .
The 'individualised' medical model is the predominant model, at least as far as the UK legislation is concerned. The emphasis is on impairment of the individual; the test is whether the impairment has a substantial effect upon that person's ability to carry out day-to-day activities which are defined by reference to the word 'normal'. In Goodwin v The Patent Office it was stated that there should be no attempt to define a day-to-day activity but that "it is not directed to the person's own particular circumstances, either at work or home", 54 and this implies that there are objective 'normal' activities. Furthermore, it has been argued 55 that the medical model is endemic in international conceptions of disability, such as the World Health Organisation's International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps, which defines disability as: "any restriction or prevention of the performance of an activity, resulting from an impairment, in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being" (emphasis added) 56 . As Barnes says, the medical model means that people with impairments "become objects to be treated, changed, improved and made normal" 57 . This is reinforced by the need for the individual disabled person to find another 'individual' with whom to compare him/herself. On the other hand, a social model means that the focus is on the adaptation of attitudes, social structures and the physical environment to accommodate people who do not fall into the mould 58 . 
Tackling discrimination -individuals, groups, everyone
In the context of sex and race discrimination, Lacey distinguishes between individuals and groups, pointing out that the individual norm is white and male (and in our case, not disabled), and further distinguishes between group rights that claim the right to be different, and those that see the aim to achieve remedial rights, where socio-economic disadvantage is the key 59 . Traditionally, disability rights have fallen into the latter group, although it is arguable that the right to be different is the better route as it has a more positive and empowering effect 60 . In the context of mental impairment this distinction is interesting. The right to be different can be particularly compelling, particularly amongst, say, people in creative jobs 61 .
Fredman's analysis of discrimination in the context of disability traces a progressive line from individual to universal rights 62 . Stressing the rights of the individual, she argues is part of the liberal ethic of rational self-interest that ignores more communitarian instincts and ignores the fact that individual merit is itself a social construct, implying that the individual should fit the job and not the other way round. Moving on to looking at minority group rights, she finds this inadequate, implying as it does discrete and insular groups united by a defining characteristic: a model that is unsuited to impairment in all its disparate forms. Fredman argues that universalism, where the range of the normal is widened and where differences are respected will promote universal access to all activities. Clearly we are a long way from this at present as both the Act itself and its interpretation 63 emphasise the normal and the abnormal dichotomy.
Arguably, therefore, a social model of disability together with a universalist approach via the principle of toleration, should be tempered by an approach that treats disabled people as non-disabled people should be treated: as unique individuals.
Ill-health outside the Disability Discrimination Act 1995
The two main categories of people who are unprotected by the Act are those who have an existing health problem but cannot satisfy the definition of disability, and those who have no health problems now but who have had problems in the past (as we shall see, an issue of specific concern in relation to mental health) 64 . Such people are unprotected unless they have at least one year's qualifying employment to enable them to bring claims for unfair dismissal. Unfair dismissal claims can be brought if employees are dismissed on the basis that they are incapable of doing the job and in such circumstances the dismissal may be fair 65 as long as a fair procedure has been followed and as long as there is no other available job within the organisation that the employee could reasonably have been offered 66 . There is also a possibility of claiming unfair constructive dismissal if the employer breaches a term of the contract 67 . This could be a breach of an express term such as changing the job content or reducing pay, or it could be a case of breaching an implied term such as that of the obligation to maintain trust and confidence 68 . Nevertheless, until the 1995 Act, disabled workers had no protection qua disabled workers. The provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 mean that disabled workers are afforded some job security in circumstances hitherto not available.
Ironically, the emphasis on a medical perspective in the Act, where protection is available from the time of applying for a job, is absent when looking at ill-health in the workplace that does not amount to a disability. Dismissal can take place on the basis that the employee is absent through ill-health and the more the medical evidence suggests that the person is incapable of doing the job concerned, the easier it is for an employer to dismiss. Only when the 'ill-health' is such as to amount to a disability does protection kick in.
PART II -MENTAL HEALTH
Mental health and employment
It is important to acknowledge that not only do people currently having mental health problems face difficulties in employment, but that previous mental ill-health can continue to give rise to prejudice and discrimination. There may, in the past, have been some form of mental condition which was disordered or thought to be disordered and, therefore, in need of treatment. In this case it will form part of the medical history of the person concerned about which s/he may be asked questions, either prior to being engaged or, as an enquiry prior to being offered a formal contract 69 . The case of O'Brien v Prudential Assurance Co 70 illustrates the difficulties that can arise. Mr O'Brien had a history of mental illness which included some hospitalisation, but at the time of making his job application he had not had any treatment or symptoms for over four years. The company's policy of not employing anyone with a history of mental illness if (as in this case) they would be visiting people in their own homes was reflected by a question on the application form and a question asked in person during the course of a pre-employment medical examination. The question asked whether he had ever consulted a psychiatrist or suffered from nervous or mental disorder. He answered in the negative, was offered and took the job and became respected for his work. The following year he applied for life assurance with the company and consented to the disclosure by his GP of his medical records. As a result of this disclosure he was dismissed on the advice of the company's senior medical adviser. Mr O'Brien's previous problems were a matter of fact and the suggestion that the tribunal should have taken into account the evidence of up to date medical evidence to the effect that he was no longer ill was rejected, and the tribunal found that it was a fair dismissal as the company policy was fair. Of course, O'Brien lost his job because of the dishonest response to a pre-employment enquiry. However, it was admitted by the company that had Mr O'Brien revealed his history of mental illness, he would not have been employed. The EAT said that if the employment had been of a different nature then it may not have been justifiable, either in terms of the enquiry itself or in terms of enforcement to the point of dismissal. O'Brien's case is over 25 years old and although the approach may be different now, it is likely that the same decision would be made. There is nothing to protect someone with a history of treatment for a mental health condition if they choose not to reveal it. Paradoxically, under the Act, if they have an existing rather than a past mental health condition they have a chance of bringing themselves within the ambit of protection.
Mental health -special considerations
Terminology in this area is fraught with difficulty. It is important to move away from the notion that all mental 'conditions' that are not typical or conventional, are necessarily disabling, whilst at the same time acknowledging the prejudice, fear and misunderstanding that exists in relation to people who might have had treatment for a non-physical 'disorder' 71 . The expression 'disorder' is problematic in itself, with its implication some sort of order needs to be imposed or restored. Mental 'illness' often suggests psychosis 72 . Further, none of these expressions is appropriate in cases of learning disabilities. I try, therefore, to use the expression 'mental health', which has the disadvantage of medicalisation, but the advantage of referring to the positive of health rather than the negative of a medical condition.
Mental health issues particularly point up the division between the medical and social models. Firstly, mental health is harder to define than forms of physical health. It rarely has any physical manifestations and it is inevitably bound up with the personality of the person concerned. A mental health atypicality can be nothing more than a minor behavioural eccentricity, 73 yet it can have a significant effect on the person's interaction with others (in our case, in the workplace) in a way in which a minor physical atypicality would not even be noticed. Secondly, there might be concern that diagnosis of mental disorder is more woolly and uncertain than in the case of physical conditions. However, there is no real evidence for this save for the inevitable difficulty already mentioned that one's mental state is also about one's personality. Thirdly, there is a fear that people can more readily fake or embellish mental disorder than physical disorder and this has long been part of the debate in the context of civil liability for psychiatric damage. However, the Law Commission has reported on this area and concluded that fraudulent or exaggerated claims can be made in respect of physical conditions too and that this should not be a reason for treating them differently 74 . Finally, mental conditions are often linked to dangerousness in the eyes of the general public 75 
Stigma and mental health
Stigma surrounding mental health issues arguably brings more socio-disadvantage than the problems that arise for the physically impaired. Some who have physical impairments, such as mobility problems are more acceptable in a social framework; the split between some of physically impaired people 76 and mentally impaired people is not unlike the split between the deserving and the undeserving poor that originated in the Victorian workhouses 77 . Indeed statistics bear out the emphasis on disability being associated with physical conditions 78 and the fact that those with mental health problems are categorised as being socially unworthy 79 . Yet despite this, it is acknowledged that even a period of short-term depression can have a seriously adverse effect on people's working life 80 .
Where the 'social' model of disability comes into its own is when examining issues of stigma, and, in particular, past episodes of mental health problems that are likely to attract as much discrimination as a current mental health problem, and, arguably, more so than a current physical health problem. These stigmatising conditions are much more akin to other aspects of people that attract prejudice e.g. skin colour, gender reassignment and so are deserving of exactly the sort of anti-discrimination protection that these have 81 .
Mental health and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995
The definition of disability
As we have seen, a person is disabled for the purposes of the Act if "he has a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal dayto-day activities" and this impairment must have lasted for at least 12 months or be reasonably expected to last for at least that period or the rest of the person's life. The earlier provision that mental impairment had to arise from an illness which was 'clinically well-recognised' has now been removed to bring it into line with physical impairments where there has never been any such requirement 82 . This had been inserted on the basis that it would screen out "obscure conditions unrecognised by reputable clinicians" or "moods and minor eccentricities" 83 . It will be suggested below that when this was re-examined by Parliament there was a missed opportunity to reform radically the particular issues surrounding mental health, and that the screening out of such things as minor eccentricities might not necessarily be wrong.
The DRC Review made two recommendations that are relevant for our purposes. Firstly, that the list of normal day to day activities should be revised to include "the ability to communicate with others" and to ensure that self-harming behaviour is covered 84 . These have not been acted upon. Secondly, the Review recommended that for those whose day-to-day activities are substantially affected as a result of depression the requirement that the effects last twelve months should be reduced to six months. They cited a number of cases where claims had failed because of an inability to satisfy the twelve month rule, for example, a case of a man who had attempted suicide and had his job offer withdrawn but whose claim failed as he could not establish that the substantial effects of his depression were likely to last twelve months or more 85 . This recommendation was not taken up when reforms were made. Direct discrimination raises issues of stereotyping 86 . For people affected by mental health problems this is particularly pertinent. As we have seen from the O'Brien case, protection is needed by people who have a history of mental health problems. Unfortunately, the protection offered by the Act on recurring and past disabilities still incorporates the definition of disability i.e. long term substantial adverse effect on carrying out normal day-to-day activities, so many people with mental health problems e.g. clinical depression, will not qualify as having a current, past or recurring disability.
Discussion
As was stated in the Report of the Social Exclusion Unit, paid employment improves self-esteem and that can only have a beneficial effect upon mental illness 87 . Given this, and the well-recognised disadvantages experienced by those who have had some spell of mental ill-health, and the even greater disadvantages of those workers or potential workers who have existing mental health problems that might not come within the ambit of the Act, there is a strong argument that, either the Act should be amended to take account of the special issues that have been under discussion, or mental health should be treated as a separate category of discrimination protection. 
Amending the Act
There might be considerable political resistance to extending the ambit of disability discrimination law. However, such objections would have to contend with the fact that there are two defences available to a claim: justification, and refusal to make adjustments that are not reasonable. There is a parallel situation in the context of indirect discrimination in other areas. For example, many employers can and do require employees to work shifts or unsocial hours. This can immediately give rise to claims that these work patterns have a disparate impact upon women who find it difficult to combine them with their traditional role of carers. However, as long as the work patterns are a proportionate response to a legitimate need, an employer has a defence. It is unfortunate, as has already been noted, 89 that, from the perspective of applicants this form of wording was not incorporated into the Act, but the fact remains that there are defences available to employers.
The most obvious reform is to make a past or present diagnosis of a mental health problem or a recognition of a learning disability, the same as a diagnosis of HIV or cancer. An objection could be raised that it would not necessarily be linked to a present or even a recurring medical condition. However, given that HIV is, in many cases, a 'bare' and symptom-free diagnosis, this objection is flawed. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the inclusion of severe disfigurement in the Act does not sit with the functional approach to disability, as there is no necessary connection between a person's ability to carry out activities of any sort and a disfigurement. There is, therefore, a precedent for such an inclusion.
It might be argued that to introduce this new category of protection would be to include an unacceptably large number of people. However, currently a diagnosis of cancer is sufficient for someone to be disabled under the Act 90 . This is despite the fact that many cancers are curable and many more are treatable over a very long period of time without significant impingement on the working lives of the persons concerned. Furthermore, one in three people will develop some form of cancer at some point in their lives 91 . The incidence of mental health problems is considerably smaller, whereby one in ten will be diagnosed as having a mental health problem and only a quarter of these will require specialist mental health services 92 . There could be no principled opposition to including this new category unless we wish to return to the deserving and the undeserving disabled dichotomy: people with cancer attract sympathy, 93 but as we have seen many people with mental health problems are stigmatised.
Furthermore, given that the proposal is to introduce a new special category of protection within the Act, the requirement that the diagnosis be of a 'well-recognised condition' could be re-established, but without the qualification that it must be 'clinically' recognised. Although the requirement was offensive in the original Act because the requirement was not applied to physical conditions, in practice, the undesirable results could be as a consequence of evidential problems in the conduct of specific litigation rather than of an underlying failure of principle 94 . Nevertheless, some might argue that it reinforces the medical model and that it harks back to the old accusations that malingering is easy and/or more prevalent in the context of mental health. On the first point, it might well do this, but we have already established that the medical model is reflected by the Act and to reject a reform that might help those who suffer from a prejudice 95 is cutting off one's medical nose to spite one's social face. Furthermore, this disparity of treatment could be dealt with by making the 'well-recognised' requirement apply to both physical and mental impairment 96 .
Moreover, it is arguable that by treating mental health in terms of social disadvantage only, rather than having had or currently experiencing a treatable condition on a par with a physical condition, one is being patronising and refusing to treat the persons concerned as being able to control and develop their own lives 97 . In any event, those with physical conditions can fall foul of difficulties in diagnosis 98 .
The strongest argument, however, is one that disposes of the above argument and the suggestion that malingering is easy where mental health is concerned. This is that well-recognised diagnostic criteria are already implicit in the inclusion of HIV, cancer and multiple sclerosis at the point of diagnosis i.e. when the recognised diagnostic criteria of these conditions have been satisfied.
Arguably, it could be said that this is further pandering to the medical model. However, the expression 'well-recognised' is not restricted, either in physical or mental impairment, to ill-health models. It could be clinically recognised or recognised by other means. Even under the old structure it was not necessary for learning disabilities to be clinically well-recognised 99 and some conditions require no medical involvement at all, let alone a formal clinical diagnosis. No medical training is necessary to recognise the fact that someone has no legs; nor would it be appropriate to regard such a person as being unhealthy. The same can be said of disfigurement. The criticism inherent in the medical versus social models is that there is a suggestion that the impaired person is abnormal and therefore only to be accommodated if relatively easy to do so. On the other hand, Wells has argued that there has to be some form of impairment, otherwise the protected group will extend to anyone who is socially disadvantaged 100 . Note, however, that there is scope for a very wide interpretation of impairment, e.g. Mabbett has argued that someone who has a skill deficiency caused by lack of educational facilities should be seen as having an impairment 101 . Certainly, just as severe disfigurements can be regarded as impairments, so can stigmatisation.
A new discrimination category?
A more radical proposal would remove mental health issues from the Act's framework all together and treat them as a separate category of discrimination. There is precedent for this in both the protection from discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment and sexual orientation. Although the European Court of Justice had specifically included gender reassignment as an aspect of sexuality that was protected by European sex discrimination provisions 102 the government made it clear beyond doubt by introducing 
